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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

CINCUSNAVEUR

SECDEF

CINCPACFLT

S E C R E T STATE 200775

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, KU, SN, US

SUBJECT: US NAVAL USE OF SINGAPORE FACILITIES

REF: (A) STATE 158208, (B) LONDON 7941, (C) CINCPAC

260012Z JUL 75.

1. IN VIEW OF THE EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE
OCCURRED ON THIS SUBJECT, A RESTATEMENT OF U.S. OBJECTIVES
IN THIS MATTER APPEARS TO BE IN ORDER. THE U.S. HAS A
FIRM INTEREST IN PRESERVING ACCESS TO SINGAPORE'S EXCELLENT
NAVAL FUEL FACILITIES, WHICH WE HAVE USED EXTENSIVELY IN
THE PAST WHILE THEY WERE UNDER UK CONTROL. SUCH ACCESS

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WOULD SATISFY SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR USN FORCES CONDUCT-

ING SPECIAL AND REGULAR FLEET OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE INDIAN OCEAN DEPLOYMENTS.

2. A RECAPITULATION OF U.S. NAVY REQUIREMENTS IS SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. PROVISION AT SINGAPORE FOR POL TANKAGE FOR U.S. NAVY UNITS IN THE FOLLOWING MINIMUM AMOUNTS:

10,000 TONS (80,000 BBLs) JP-5

10,000 TONS (80,000 BBLs) DFM

AN ADDITIONAL 10,000 TONS OF EITHER JP-5 OR DFM WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

B. ASSURED PRIORITY ACCESS FOR U.S. NAVAL UNITS TO BERTHS 6 AND 7 AT THE SEMBAWANG NAVAL BASIN AND THE MAN OF WAR (MOW) ANCHORAGE TO ACCOMMODATE A PROJECTED LEVEL OF SHIP VISITS OF OR EQUIVALENT TO AT LEAST:

FOR CY 1975 (JUL - DEC) 150 SHIP DAYS,
80 PERCENT AT NAVAL BASIN AND 20 PERCENT AT MOW ANCHORAGE

FOR CY 1976, 210 SHIP DAYS - 80 PERCENT AT NAVAL BASIN
AND 20 PERCENT AT MOW ANCHORAGE

FOR CY 1977, 180-200 SHIP DAYS - 80 PERCENT AT NAVAL BASIN
AND 20 PERCENT AT MOW ANCHORAGE

C. ASSURED ACCESS FOR NAVAL UNITS TO THE BERTHS AT THE LEVEL PROJECTED ABOVE WOULD INCLUDE NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS VISITS ACCEPTED ON BASIS OF U.S. STANDARD STATEMENT ASSURANCES.

D. POL AND BERTHING FACILITIES SHOULD BE AVAILABLE ON MINIMUM GIVEN NOTICE AND NOT BE SUBJECT TO EMBARGO OR RESTRICTIONS IN THE EVENT OF RENEWAL OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES OR ANY SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCE.

3. IN ORDER TO RETAIN GUARANTEED ACCESS, THE USG HAD HOPED TO WORK OUT SOME ARRANGEMENT WHERE THE FUEL FACILITIES
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REMAINED UNDER THE MANAGEMENT OF A THIRD COUNTRY ALLY EVEN AFTER THE UK WITHDRAWAL. THIS DESIRE WAS REINFORCED BY PRIME MINISTER LEE DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT WHEN HE STATED THAT FOR POLITICAL REASONS BOTH THE USG AND GOS SHOULD PREFER AN ANZUS COVER FOR THE FUEL FACILITIES. FOR THE LAST FEW MONTHS, USG HAS BEEN DISCUSSING WITH GONZ THE POSSIBILITY OF THAT COUNTRY ASSUMING MANAGEMENT OF THESE FACILITIES. AS NOTED IN REF A, HOWEVER, THE GONZ

DID NOT APPEAR IN A POSITION TO MEET USN REQUIREMENTS SATISFACTORILY AND THE USG NOW INTENDS TO PURSUE AS AN ALTERNATIVE THE ARRANGEMENTS BEING WORKED OUT WITH SINGAPORE BY THE UK.

4. REF B FORWARDED AN OUTLINE OF THE UK PLANS WHICH INCLUDED PROVISION FOR U.S. WE ARE PREPARED TO POOL OUR REQUIREMENTS WITH THOSE OF THE BRITISH, AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS AND LET UK WORK OUT THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH GOS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT RELINQUISHING MANAGEMENT OF THE FUEL FARM AND BERTHS TO GOS WOULD BE UNWISE POLITICALLY (PARTICULARLY GIVEN PM LEE'S STATEMENT) AND, IN TURN, COULD IN A CRISIS JEOPARDIZE THE GUARANTEED

ACCESS WE SEEK. CONSEQUENTLY, WE WISH TO MAKE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO RETAIN UK MANAGEMENT OF THESE FACILITIES UNDER CIVILIAN AEGIS. OUR PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES SUGGEST THAT THIS IS TECHNICALLY PRACTICAL AND THAT THE HMG MAY BE AMENABLE POLITICALLY, IF PRESSED.

5. DRAWING ON THE FOREGOING AS NECESSARY, EMBASSY SHOULD APPROACH FCO AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. THE USG SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UK-GOS ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD ASSURE GUARANTEED ACCESS FOR THE WARSHIPS OF THE U.S., UK, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND TO THE POL FACILITIES AND BERTHS 6 AND 7 OF THE STORES BASIN. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE USG DOES NOT DISASSOCIATE THE POL STORAGE FROM THE BERTHS AND BELIEVES THE TWO ARE INEXTRICABLY LINKED WHEN DISCUSSING ACCESS.

B. IT IS THE USG'S FIRM OPINION THAT THE BEST ARRANGEMENT

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MENT FOR GUARANTEEING ACCESS WOULD BE TO RETAIN THE FUEL FACILITIES AND BERTHS UNDER UK MANAGEMENT USING GOVERNMENT CIVILIANS. THE FUEL FARM IS PRESENTLY ADMINISTERED BY TWO UK CIVILIANS WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ABOUT 15 LOCAL HIRE AND OUR TECHNICAL INVESTIGATION INDICATES THAT THIS NUMBER IS SUFFICIENT FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF BOTH THE FUEL FARM AND BERTHS 6 AND 7. IN ESSENCE WE ARE CONVINCED THAT RETAINING UK CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE PLANS TO WITHDRAW MILITARY FORCES FROM SINGAPORE. FYI: WE DO NOT WISH TO CAST THIS APPROACH IN THE CONTEXT OF A PROPOSAL FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE PLANNED DEFENSE WITHDRAWAL FROM SINGAPORE BUT RATHER IN TERMS OF A RESPONSE TO REF B, IN ORDER NOT TO UNDULY EXCITE THE UK POLITICAL SIDE OF THE HOUSE OR TO MAKE WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A MODEST PROPOSAL INTO A MAJOR ISSUE. END FYI. FURTHERMORE, IT

WOULD FURNISH THE POLITICAL FACADE WHICH THE GOS NEEDS TO GUARANTEE ACCESS. IF STRUCTURED PROPERLY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE GOS WOULD BE AMENABLE TO SUCH A PROPOSAL. THE USG WOULD BE WILLING TO USE ITS INFLUENCE IF NECESSARY TO ASSIST IN OBTAINING GOS APPROVAL.

C. THE USG FUEL REQUIREMENTS ARE AS SET FORTH IN PARA 2A ABOVE AND THE PROJECTED LEVEL OF SHIP VISITS IS AS OUTLINED IN PARA 2B ABOVE.

D. IN ORDER TO ENHANCE ACCEPTABILITY OF SUCH A PROPOSAL TO GOS, THE USG IS AGREEABLE TO MAKING ANY EMPTY TANKS IN THE FUEL FARM AVAILABLE TO THE GOS FOR USE IN STORAGE OF COMPATIBLE PRODUCTS. LIKEWISE, THE USG IS AGREEABLE TO ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH MAKES BERTHS 6 AND 7 AVAILABLE TO

COMMERCIAL SHIPS WHEN NOT IN USE BY WARSHIPS. THAT IS PRESENTLY THE PRACTICE IN THE STORES BASIN AND HAS NOT PRESENTED ANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS EITHER TO THE RN OR GOS. THE USN, OF COURSE WOULD LIKE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO BERTHS 6 AND 7 ON AT LEAST 72 HOURS NOTICE.

E. COSTS. ALTHOUGH FUNDING HAS NOT BEEN A PROMINENT CONCERN, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO INDICATE AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UK THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN APPROPRIATE FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS
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TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED. MOREOVER, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO OFFER THE SERVICES OF THE U.S. NAVAL OFFICE, SINGAPORE, TO THE UK TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN LOCAL CONTRACTING AND LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISITING SHIPS.

F. THE QUESTION OF ACCESS BY NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS IS OF COURSE SEPARATE FROM THE ISSUE OF A GUARANTEED FUEL SUPPLY. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE BRITISH THAT, WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS DO NOT REQUIRE THE FUEL FACILITIES FURNISHED AT BERTHS SIX AND SEVEN, WE CONSIDER IT HIGHLY IMPORTANT THAT ACCESS BY US NPW'S TO THESE BERTHS BE CONTINUED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE ASSURANCES CONTAINED IN THE U.S. STANDARD STATEMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THE UK WILL TAKE THE SAME POSITION WITH THE GOS IN CLARIFYING WHAT WILL BE INCLUDED UNDER THE GUARANTEED ACCESS PROVISION. FYI: RN IS CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF DISCUSSING WITH GOS THE IMPACT OF ITS WITHDRAWAL ON NPW VISITS AND IS SEEKING FOR GOS TO TAKE OVER FROM THE RN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SINGAPORE SPECIAL SAFETY SCHEME. THIS IS THE EMERGENCY PLAN DEVELOPED JOINTLY BY UK AND GOS TO COVER ACTIONS TO BE

TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF AN NPW REACTOR ACCIDENT. IMPLEMENTATION IS LARGELY CARRIED OUT BY UK, INCLUDING PROVISION OF A STANDBY EMERGENCY MONITORING TEAM, SO LONG AS THE UK IS THE OFFICIAL FACILITY OPERATOR. WITH PHASEOUT OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY UK HAS APPROACHED GOS SEEKING THEIR AGREEMENT TO ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EMERGENCY PLAN WITH UK NPW VISITING SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE UK STANDARD STATEMENT. IF WE GET UK TO RETAIN MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY OF BERTHS SIX AND SEVEN, IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EMERGENCY PLAN WOULD BE HANDLED. IN VIEW OF APPROACH ALREADY MADE TO GOS WE SUSPECT UK WOULD CONTINUE TO DESIRE TO TRANSFER THIS RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SINGAPOREANS. WHAT CONDITIONS GOS MAY REQUIRE AND EFFECT THESE CONDITIONS COULD HAVE ON NPW VISITS ARE UNKNOWN. UK IS OBVIOUSLY FACED WITH A DIFFICULT SITUATION AND WE WILL NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT ON RESOLUTION OF THIS ASPECT IF WE ARE TO ENSURE THAT U.S.

NPW ACCESS, SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF U.S. STANDARD STATEMENT,
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IS MAINTAINED. END FYI.

6. FOR SINGAPORE: ASSUMING EMBASSY LONDON HAS NO OBJECTION, YOU MAY INFORM GOS (AS PROPOSED IN SINGAPORE 3436) THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH UK AND THAT GOS WILL BE CONSULTED AS SOON AS FIRM PROPOSAL IS DEVELOPED.

7. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. ROBINSON

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